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Abstract
Despite the major advances in information technology that have shaped the recent
wave of globahzation, openness to trade is still a political choice, and trade policy
can change with shifts in domestic political equilibria. This paper suggests that a
particular threat and a limiting factor to globalization and its future developments
may be militarist sentiments that appear to be on the rise among many nations
around the globe today. We proxy militarism by spending on the military and the
size of the military, and document that over the past 20 years, countries experiencing
greater increases in militarism according to these measures have had lower growth
in trade. Focusing on bilateral trade flows, we also show that controlling flexibly for
country trends, a pair of countries jointly experiencing greater increases in militarism
has lower growth in bilateral trade.
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1 Introduction
We live in an unprecedented age of globalization, where technology, ideas, factors
of production and goods are increasingly mobile across national boundaries. The
current wave of globalization is distinguished from previous ones in part because of the
major role of information technology. Nevertheless, globalization is not irreversible.
Openness to international trade, finance and technology is a choice that countries
make, and despite the facilitating role of information technology, many countries, even
many leading players in the world economy including the United States, China, India,
Brazil and Russia, could decide to close their borders. A major cause of the end of
the previous (also historically unprecedented) 19th century wave of globalization was
disillusionment with the international economic order, in large part precipitated by
the Great Depression (e.g., Harold James, 2001). Another, somewhat less emphasized
though not necessarily less important cause Avas the rise of nationalism, militarism
and international conflict (e.g., Ronald Findlay and Kevin H. O'Rourke, 2007, Reuven
Glick and Alan M. Taylor, 2006).^ The previous wave of globalization took place in the
context of the 100 years following the end of Napoleonic wars, which were vmusually
peaceful for European powers; it came to an end following the most widespread
conflict that human society had experienced until then. World War I.
In this paper, we emphasize that globalization, which depends on political deci-
sions of nation states, has political limits, and that these limits are related to na-
tionalism and militarism. Despite the increasing reach of globalization, anecdotal
evidence suggests that nationalism and militarism are strong around the world, in
countries ranging from the United States to China, Russia and India (e.g., Robert
Kagan, 2008). To go beyond anecdotal evidence, in this paper we proxy nationalist
^Militarism is defined as the doctrine or policy of "'aggressive military preparedness," which
typically leads to a country maintaining a strong military capability to defend or promote its national
interests.
and militarist sentiments by military spending.'^ In addition to being a useful proxy,
military spending might itself impact trade, for example, because it contributes to
tensions or leads to skirmishes between countries. Figure 1 shows the evolution of
world trade and total military spending between 1988 and 2007. It depicts the steady
rise of trade over the past two decades, during which we have data on military expen-
ditures and the size of military personnel across a large number of countries (as is well
known, the increase in the volume of trade during this time period reflects longer-term
trends, e.g., Findlay and O'Rourke, 2007). It also shows that military spending, after
declining for a number of years, started increasing from the mid-1990s onwards. This
pattern indeed indicates that there might be more than anecdotal evidence pointing
to a strengthening in nationalist sentiments and miUtarism.
Our main contribution in this paper is to show that military spending, in our
interpretation as a proxy for nationalist sentiment and militarism, is negatively as-
sociated with trade. We present two types of evidence. First, we show that between
1985 and 2005, countries that experience a greater increase in military expenditure
or the size of the military show a relative decline in the volume of trade (compared to
other countries in the sample). Moreover, countries whose trading partners ("neigh-
bors" ) show greater increases in military expenditure or the size of the military also
show a similar decline. These patterns are robust across different specifications and
in different subsamples. Second, we investigate bilateral trade patterns again between
1985 and 2005. The data suggest that trade between two countries grows less rapidly
when both become more militarized. While not as robust as the first set of findings,
this pattern is generally present in a variety of different specifications.
In summary, the data point to a negative correlation between militarization and
^This is true almost by definition of militarism. Tom W. Smith and Lawrence Jarkko (2001)
provide several measures of "national pride" constructed from survey evidence, some of which are
strongly correlated with military spending across countries.
trade. Although we cannot ascertain a causal relationship, the evidence is broadly
consistent with an association between the strength of nationalist sentiments and
militarism, as proxied by military expenditures or the size of the military, and in-
ternational trade. Overall, this evidence suggests that there might be political and
military limits to, and dangers against, globalization.
Our paper is related to three separate literatures. First, several studies in economic
history have investigated the causes of the end of the 19th century globalization (e.g.,
James, 2001, Barry Eichengreen and Douglas A. Irwin, 2009). Second, there is a
large and growing literature in international relations on the so-called "liberal theory,"
based on ideas first articulated by Montesquieu and Kant, that greater trade makes
war less likely (see, for example, John R. Oneal and Bruce Russett, 1999, Simon
Polachek, 1980). Several papers in this literature have simultaneously estimated the
effect of trade on war and of war disruptions on trade (e.g., Philippe Martin, Thierry
Mayer and Mathias Thoenig, 2008, or Havard Herge, Oneal and Russett, 2009), and
find a negative effect of war on trade. It is worth noting, however, that the effect of
militarization we focus on is distinct from this disruption effect, and we demonstrate
this by showing that the effect survives when all countries or country pairs engaged
in military conflict are excluded from the data."^ Finally, our paper is also related
to Anna Maria Mayda and Dani Rodrik (2002) and O'Rourke and Richard Sinnott
(2001), who document a negative relationship between attitudes towards trade and
nationalist sentiment in survey responses.
''Our results may nonetheless capture the fact that greater military spending by a country and
its neighbors increases the likelihood of military conflict in the future, the anticipation of which
discourages trade. We view this as part of the impact of militarism on trade in which we are
interested.
2 Data
Our measure of trade (opeuness) is a country's trade share of GDP in constant prices
from Summers-Heston dataset, 2009. We use this same dataset to measure real GDP
per capita and total population.'*
Bilateral trade data are from the International Monetary Fund Direction of Trade
Statistics, 2009 (DoT) CD-ROM. Let A'^^ denote bilateral between i and j in year
s, meaning the sum of exports from i to j and exports from j to i in year s. We
calculate Xijs for all country pairs in year s for which both flows from i to j and from
j to i are available. These flows can be measured using either FOB (free on board)
exports from i to j or GIF (cost, insurance, and freight) imports by j from i. When
both are available, we take the average, and otherwise we use whichever measure is
available. Using this measure, we construct a measure of bilateral trade between i
and j as a fraction of i's total trade and we multiply this measure by i's trade share
from the Summers-Heston dataset so as to achieve a measure of the bilateral trade
between i and j as a fraction of z's GDP.
Military spending (as a fraction of GDP) is from the Stockholm International
Peace Research Institute FIRST Database.^ We multiply this fraction by total GDP
using GDP per capita and population from the Summers-Heston dataset to create a
measure of military spending. Military size measures total military personnel and is
also from FIRST.'' Using the mihtary spending and military size data, we construct
a mecisure of the militarization of "neighbors". Specifically, let tOij represent the
inverse distance in kilometers between i's capital and j's capital.^ We then calculate
a weighted average of the log military spending of country i's neighbors using the
''Trade and GDP data are missing for Russia for 1988 so we use the 1989 value.
^ Facts on International Relations and Security Trends Database, http://first.sipri.org/
'^Mihtary spending in 1988 is missing for China and for Ru.ssia, so we use the mihtary spending
from 1989 for both observations.
'^Distance between capital cities is from Kristian S. Gleditsch and Michael D. Ward (2001).
ujij^s as the (relative) weight of country j (7^ i) in this calculation. We use the same
method to calculate the weighted average of the log military size of neighbors. This
measure captures both the militarization of neighboring countries which would pose
the greatest military threat to country i and also the militarization of those countries
with which country i should trade most heavily according to the standard gravity
models.
For the regressions using mihtary spending, the beginning date of the sample is
1988 and the end date is 2005. For the regressions using military size, the beginning
date of the sample is 1985 and the end date is 2003. These dates are chosen to
maximize the number of countries in our sample given data availability.
Finally, as a robustness check we exclude countries (or country-pairs) in which a
country (at least one of the countries in the pair) experiences a civil or international
war between 1985 and 2005. For this exercise, we use the International Peace Research
Institute and Uppsala Conflict Data Program Armed Conflict Dataset,^ and we code
a country as experiencing a civil war if it experiences an intrastate armed conflict of
war intensity, and we code a country as experiencing an international war if it is a
primary party in an interstate armed conflict of wai^ intensity.
3 Cross-Country Evidence
We start with cross-country evidence and investigate the relationship between mili-
tarization and trade using the following long-difference regression model:
(1) Ay, = aAm, + Ax'/3-f-it,.
^ Armed Conflict Dataset. http://www.prio.no/CSCW/Datasets/Armed-Conflict/UCDP-PRIO/
Here Ay, is the change in the trade share of GDP of country i between the beginning
and the end dates of the sample; Am; is the change mihtarization (i.e., log military
spending or log mihtary size) of either country i or of country i's neighbors; Ax^
represents the change in a vector of covariates (log GDP per capita, log population,
and OECD differential trends in some specifications); and u, is an error term. We
focus on long-difference specifications to capture medium-run trends as opposed to
annual fluctuations. Naturally, this specification is algebraically equivalent to a panel
data regression with two observations per country and a full set of country and year
fixed effects.^
Table 1 reports estimates of equation (1). In Panel A, militarization is mea-
sured as (log) military spending, while in Panel B militarization is (log) military size.
Throughout we report standard errors that are robust against arbitrary heteroskedas-
ticity.
Column 1 in Panel A reports an estimate of a of -17.6 with standard error (s.e.=
6.3). This coefficient, which is statistically significant at less than 1%, also implies
an economically large effect: a 10 percent increase in military spending over two
decades, holding all else constant, is associated with a reduction in trade share to
GDP of approximately 1.8 percent. ^'^ This result is illustrated graphically in Figure
2, which displays a residual plot of trade share vs. military spending and shows a
strong negative relationship.
Columns 2-4 explore the robustness of this pattern. In column 2, we exclude Asian
countries, many of which have experienced an increase in militarization simultane-
'The results are similar if the level equation corresponding to (1) is estimated on annual data
with a full set of country and year fixed effects.
^"The median country in the sample experienced an increase in log military spending of .16 over
the sample period. The increase in trade during the same period is captured by the constant (the
equivalent of a common "time effect" in a panel regression). The regression is therefore exploiting
whether a country's variation around the global trend towards greater trade is due to variation in
militarization.
ously with rapid increases in international trade, which may have had other causes,
related to the increasing abihty of Western companies to outsource and offshore to
Asia. The estimate of « increases to -22.6 (s.e.= 7.1), confirming that the relationship
between militarization and trade is stronger without Asian countries. Column 3 in-
vestigates whether our results capture the impact of trade disruption caused by wars;
it excludes countries engaged in civil wars or in international wars. Interestingly, our
results are stronger once these countries are excluded (coefficient -24.5, s.e.= 9.3).
This bolsters our belief that our results are related to the relationship between trade
and militarism. Finally, column 4 includes a dummy for OECD countries, allowing
differential trend in trade for this group of countries. Even though OECD countries
appear to experience faster growth in trade, this has no effect on our estimate of a,
which is almost identical to that in colunm 1.
Columns 5-8 are analogous to cohunns 1-4, but use the log military spending
of neighbors, as defined in the previous section, in place of m,. In column 5, the
coefficient estimate of a is -33.0 (s.e.= 14.3). This estimate is almost twice that
in column 1, suggesting tliat increases in militarization by geographically proximate
neighbors is associated with even a larger relative decline in trade. Columns 6-8 show
that this pattern is robust to the same set of specification checks as in columns 2-4.
Finally, column 9 includes both log militarization of a country and the weighted log
militarization of its neighbors. The effect of own military expenditure is very similar
to that in column 1 and statistically significant at less than 1%, while the effect of
neighbors' military expenditure is still large but no longer statistically significant.
In Panel B, militarization is measured as log military size. The results are similar
to those in Panel A, with a somewhat smaller quantitative effects from own milita-
rization and larger effects from militarization of neighbors.
Overall, the cross-country evidence shows a relatively robust association between
changes in military expenditure or size of military personnel and changes in interna-
tional trade between 1985 and 2005. ,
4 Evidence from Bilateral Trade
We next investigate more disaggregated bilateral trade flows data. This allows us to
control not only for global trends but also for differences between country pairs, so
that we can directly look at whether a country will reduce its trade with a (potential)
trading partner that is becoming more militarized. More specifically, we estimate the
following gravity-type equation:
(2) Ay,j = aAm,mj + Ax',jp+7]^ + 7]^ + u,j,
where Ay,j now represents the change in the trade with country j as a fraction of
country i's GDP; Am^mj is the change in the interaction of i and j's militarization;
and the vector Ax,j includes change in the interaction of log GDP per capita and log
population of countries i and j; ?/f and 7/^ represent a full set of home and trading
partner country fixed effects; and i(,j is the error term which is allowed to have an
arbitrary pattern of heteroskedasticity with clustering at the country-pair level.
Analogously to equation (1), this specification focuses on long differences and re-
moves all country-pair specific characteristics that might simultaneously affect bilat-
eral trade and militarization of either country. In addition, the specification removes
all country specific trends (which are the focus of Table 1) by including a full set
of home country and trading partner country dummies. The coefficient of interest
is a which measures the effect of a country's militarization interacted with that of
its trading partner. The results from the estimation of equation (2) are reported in
Table 2.
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Columns 1-4 use log military spending as our measure of militarization. Column
1 shows the interaction effect of home and trading partner's militarization is negative
and statistically significant at less than 1% (a = -0.090 and s.e.=: 0.029), so that
there is a strong negative association between a joint rise in the militarization of the
country pair and bilateral trade. ^''-
Column 2 excludes Asian countries. The results are similar and stronger; the
interaction effect is both larger and more precisely estimated. Column 3 excludes
country pairs where at least one country experienced a civil or international war;
the results are also stronger than those in column 1}^ Finally, column 4 includes
two dummy variables, one for both countries being in the OECD, and one for only
one country being in the OECD (the omitted group is neither country being in the
OECD). The results are again similar to those in column 1.^'^
Columns 5-8 are analogous to columns 1-4, except that militarization is measured
as log military size. The estimates in these columns are also negative, though generally
imprecisely estimated and insignificant.
5 Concluding Remarks
This short paper emphasized that, despite the major advances in information tech-
nology encouraging globalization, openness to trade is still a political choice. This
suggests that changes in domestic political equilibria might introduce limits to the
process of globalization. We illustrated this general point by focusing on the effect of
militarization, which has seen a recent revival, on country-level and bilateral trade.
"The quantitative magnitudes of tliis effect is large. A 5.75 point value of AniiVij (tlie median
increase in the sample period) reduces bilateral trade relative to GDP by about 0.529c. The median
bilateral trade to GDP ratio in 2005 is about 0.06%.
^^None of these results change if we instead only exclude countries which are directly fighting
against each other.
^'In addition, the estimates show that country pairs in the OECD and country pairs with only
one country in the OECD have experienced slower growth in bilateral trade than the baseline.
The evidence we presented suggests that countries experiencing greater mihtarization
and those witnessing greater mihtarization among their neighbors (trading partners)
have seen relatively smaller increases in trade over the past 20 years. We also docu-
mented that country pairs experiencing greater joint increases in militarization have
seen relative declines in bilateral trade.
Our results come with several caveats. First, it is unclear to what extent these
empirical patterns reflect causality since trade and militarization simultaneously affect
each other and may themselves be affected by a third factor. Second, we do not have
an explanation for the apparent rise in nationalism and militarization around the
world.
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